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1. Introduction 
Recent work on national systems of innovation (Amable 2003; Hall and Soskice 2001; Lorenz and Lundvall 2006; Whitley 2006) has argued that there are systematic relations between systems of labour market regulation and social protection on the one hand, and the dynamics of knowledge accumulation and learning at the work place on the other. Systems combining low levels of employment protection with relatively high levels of unemployment protection and expenditure on ‘active’ labour market policies may have an advantage in terms of the adoption of the forms of work organisation and knowledge exploration at the firm level that can lead to ‘new to the market’ and possibly radical innovation. This is related to the fact that organisations which compete on the basis of strategies of continuous knowledge exploration tend to have relatively porous organisational boundaries so as to permit the insertion of new knowledge and ideas from the outside. Job tenures tend to be short as careers are often structured around a series of discrete projects rather than advancing within an intra-firm hierarchy (Lam and Lundvall 2006). While the absence of legal restrictions on hiring and firing will not necessarily result in the forms of labour market mobility that contribute to a continuous evolution of the firm’s knowledge base, strong systems of employment protection may prove an obstacle to their development.

Well developed systems of unemployment protection in association with active labour market polices, on the other hand, may contribute to the development of fluid labour markets for two complementary reasons. Firstly, in terms of incentives, the security such systems provide in terms of income maintenance can encourage individuals to commit themselves to what would otherwise be perceived as unacceptably risky forms of employment and career paths. Second, active labour market policies, including expenditures on continuous vocational education and other forms of life-long-learning, contribute to the flexibility of labour markets by supporting the continuous reconfiguration the workforce’s skills and competences.

The main contribution of this paper is to develop a set of EU-wide aggregate measures that are used to explore at the national level the relation between the organisation of work and systems of labour market regulation and social protection. In order to construct the aggregate measures of work organisation we use the results of the third European survey of Working Conditions carried out at the level of employees by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Working Conditions in the 15 EU member countries in 2000.  Measures of labour market regulation and social protection measures are derived from the aggregate labour market and social protection indicators available on Eurostat’s electronic data base in combination with the OECD’s measures of the strictness of employment protection legislation for the 14 EU nations in 1999-2000 for which the data is available.​[2]​ Although our data can only show correlations rather than causality and are aggregated at the national level, they support the view that the way work is organised is systematically linked to the structure of systems of labour market regulation and social protection.
 
The paper is structured in the following manner. Section 2 describes the variables used to characterise work organisation in the 15 countries of the European Union and presents the results of a factor analysis and a hierarchical clustering used to construct a typology of forms of work organisation. The relative importance of these forms across EU member states is examined, controlling for the effects of sector, firm size and occupational category. Section 3 describes the aggregate indicators used to develop measures of labour market regulation and social protection, and presents the results of a principal components and cluster analysis used to categorise EU nations. Section 4 explores the relation between forms of work organisation and national labour market and social protection institutions. Section 5 concludes by briefly considering the policy implications of our results.

2. Measuring forms of work organisation in the European Union​[3]​
In order to map the forms of work organisation adopted by firms across the European Union we draw on the results of the third European Survey of Working Conditions undertaken by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.​[4]​ The survey questionnaire was directed to approximately 1500 active persons in each country with the exception of Luxembourg with only 500 respondents. The total survey population is 21703 persons, of which 17910 are salaried employees. The survey methodology is based on a ‘random walk’ multi-stage random sampling method involving face-to-face interviews undertaken at the respondent’s principal residence. The analysis presented here is based on the responses of the 8081 salaried employees working in establishments with at least 10 persons in both industry and services, but excluding agriculture and fishing; public administration and social security; education; health and social work; and private domestic employees. 

It is important to emphasize that the use of employee-level data allows us to capture the frequencies of adoption of different forms or work organisation within private sector establishments in the EU. It does not allow us to measure the diffusion of particular types of firms or enterprise structures. This means that our results are fully consistent with the possibility that multiple forms of work organisation are being used within the same establishment. 
Table 1
Work Organisation Variables
	Percent of employees
Team work	64.2
Job rotation 	48.9
Responsibility for quality control 	72.6
Quality norms 	74.4
Problem solving activities 	79.3
Learning new things in work 	71.4
Complexity of tasks 	56.7
Discretion in fixing work methods 	61.7
Discretion in setting work pace	63.6
Horizontal constraints on work pace 	53.1
Hierarchical constraints on work pace 	38.9
Norm-based constraints on work pace 	38.7
Automatic constraints on work pace 	26.7
Monotony of tasks 	42.4
Repetitiveness of tasks 	24.9
n	8081
Source: Third Working Conditions survey, European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions
Table 1 above presents the 15 binary variables derived from the Working Conditions survey data that are used to capture the diffusion across the EU of the different forms of work organisation.​[5]​ In order to assign employees to distinct categories or groups, we first undertake a factor analysis​[6]​ to identify the underlying associations that exist among the 15 organisation variables described in Table 1. We then use the factor scores or the coordinates of the observations on the factors as a basis for clustering individuals into distinct groups of work systems, using Ward’s hierarchical clustering method. This allows us to distinguish between four basic systems of work organisation as presented in Table 2.​[7]​ For example, 64.3% of all employees with a job subject to discretionary learning report team work. 

The first cluster, which account for 39 percent of the employees, ​[8]​ is distinctive for the way high levels of autonomy in work are combined with high levels of learning, problem-solving and task complexity. The variables measuring constraints on work pace, monotony and repetitiveness are under-represented.  The use of team work is about at the average level for the population as a whole, while less than half of the employees in this cluster participate in job rotation which points to the importance of horizontal job specialisation. The forms of work organisation in this cluster correspond rather closely to those found in Mintzberg’s (1979, 1983) ‘operating adhocracy’ and due to the combined importance of work discretion and learning we refer to this cluster as the ‘discretionary learning’ form. 

The second cluster accounts for 28 percent of the employees. Compared to the first cluster, work organisation in the second cluster is characterised by low levels of employee discretion in setting work pace and methods. The use of job rotation and team work, on the other hand, are much higher than in the first cluster, and work effort is more constrained by quantitative production norms and by the collective nature of work organisation. The use of quality norms is the highest of the four clusters and the use of employee responsibility for quality control is considerably above the average level for the population as a whole. These features point to a more structured or bureaucratic style of organisational learning that corresponds rather closely to the characteristics of the Japanese or ‘lean production’ model associated with the work of MacDuffie and Krafcik (1992) and Womack et al. (1990). 

The third class, which groups 14 percent of the employees, corresponds in most respects to a classic characterisation of taylorism. The work situation is in most respects the opposite of that found in the first cluster, with low discretion and low level of learning and problem-solving. Interestingly, three of the core work practices associated with the lean production model – teams, job rotation and quality norms – are somewhat over-represented in this cluster, implying that these practices are highly imperfect measures of a transition to new forms of work organisation characterised by high levels of learning and problem-solving. The characteristics of this cluster draw attention to the importance of what some authors have referred to as ‘flexible taylorism’ (Boyer and Durand, 1993; Cézard, Dussert and Gollac, 1992; Linhart, 1994). 
Table 2
Work Organisation Clusters
	    
	Percent of employees by work organisation cluster reporting each variable
Variable	Discretionary learning	Lean production	Taylorism	 Traditional organisation	Average
Team work	64.3	84.2	70.1	33.4	64.2
Job rotation	44.0	70.5	53.2	27.5	48.9
Quality norms	78.1	94.0	81.1	36.1	74.4
Responsibility for quality control	86.4	88.7	46.7	38.9	72.6
Problem solving activities	95.4	98.0	5.7	68.7	79.3
Learning new things in work	93.9	81.7	42.0	29.7	71.4
Complexity of tasks	79.8	64.7	23.8	19.2	56.7
Discretion in fixing work methods 	89.1	51.8	17.7	46.5	61.7
Discretion in setting work rate	87.5	52.2	27.3	52.7	63.6
Horizontal constraints on work rate	43.6	80.3	66.1	27.8	53.1
Hierarchical constraints on work rate	19.6	64.4	66.5	26.7	38.9
Norm-based constraints on work rate	21.2	75.5	56.3	14.7	38.7
Automatic constraints on work rate	5.4	59.8	56.9	7.2	26.7
Monotony of tasks	19.5	65.8	65.6	43.9	42.4
Repetitiveness of tasks	12.8	41.9	37.1	19.2	24.9
Source: Third Working Conditions survey, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions


The fourth cluster groups 19 percent of the employees. All the variables are underrepresented with the exception of monotony in work, which is close to the average.  The frequency of the two variables measuring learning and task complexity is the lowest among the four types of work organisation, while at the same time there are few constraints on the work rate. This class presumably groups traditional forms of work organisation where methods are for the most part informal and non-codified. 


How Europe’s economies work and learn
Table 3 shows that there are wide differences in the importance of the four forms of work organisation across European nations. The discretionary learning forms of work organisation are most widely diffused in the Netherlands, the Nordic countries and to a lesser extent Germany and Austria, while they are little diffused in Ireland and the southern European nations. The lean model is most in evidence in the UK, Ireland, and Spain and to a lesser extent in France, while it is little developed in the Nordic countries or in Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. The taylorist forms of work organisation show almost the reverse trend compared to the discretionary learning forms, being most frequent in the southern European nations and in Ireland and Italy. Finally, the traditional forms of work organisation are most in evidence in Greece and Italy and to a lesser extent in Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Spain and Portugal.

Forms of work organisation tend to vary according to sectors and occupational category, and this raises the question of what part of the variation in the importance of these forms across EU nations can be accounted for by the nation’s specific industrial and occupational structure. In order to determine the importance of ‘national factors’, we use logit regression analysis to provide estimates of the impact of national effects on the relative likelihood of adopting the different work models (See Table 4). Germany, the most populous nation within the EU, is the reference case for the estimates of national effects. In each case the dependent variable is a binary variable measuring whether or not the individual is subject to the particular form of work organisation. The independent variable for columns 1 through 4 in Table 4 is a categorical variable for the 14 countries plus the reference category of Germany. Thus column 1 gives the likelihood that employees are subject to the ‘discretionary learning’ form of work organisation in each country relative to the German case.



Table 3
National Differences in Forms of Work Organisation

	Percent of employees by country in each organisational class
	Discretionary learning	Lean production	Taylorist organisation	Traditional organisation	Total
Belgium	38.9	25.1	13.9	22.1	100.0
Denmark	60.0	21.9	6.8	11.3	100.0
Germany	44.3	19.6	14.3	21.9	100.0
Greece	18.7	25.6	28.0	27.7	100.0
Italy	30.0	23.6	20.9	25.4	100.0
Spain	20.1	38.8	18.5	22.5	100.0
France	38.0	33.3	11.1	17.7	100.0
Ireland	24.0	37.8	20.7	17.6	100.0
Luxembourg	42.8	25.4	11.9	20.0	100.0
Netherlands	64.0	17.2	5.3	13.5	100.0
Portugal	26.1	28.1	23.0	22.8	100.0
United Kingdom	34.8	40.6	10.9	13.7	100.0
Finland	47.8	27.6	12.5	12.1	100.0
Sweden	52.6	18.5	7.1	21.7	100.0
Austria	47.5	21.5	13.1	18.0	100.0
EU-15	39.1	28.2	13.6	19.1	100.0
Source: Third Working Condition survey. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions



Columns 5 through 8 present estimates of the relative likelihood of adopting the various forms of work organisation with structural controls. We have introduced three control variables corresponding to sector, establishment size and occupational category. The respective reference categories for the estimates are the vehicle sector, firms with 10 to 49 employees, and the occupational category of machine operator and assembler. 

As the column 1 results show, the country the employee works in has a significant impact on the relative likelihood of using the discretionary learning forms. Compared to the German case, for which the use of the discretionary learning forms of work organisation are near the 15-country weighted average (see Table 3 above), there are three countries where the learning model is more extensively used: Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark. There are no significant differences in the use of discretionary learning in four countries: Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland and Austria. The learning model is less in evidence in the remaining seven countries. Column 5 indicates that these results are robust after controlling for the effect of firm size, industry structure, and occupation, with the exception of Sweden, for which the coefficient estimate though still positive is no longer significant. 
Table 4
Logit Estimates of National Effects on Organisational Practice

	Logit estimates without structural controls	Logit estimates with structural controls
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Discretionary learning organisation	Lean organisation	Taylorism 	Traditional organisation	Discretionary learning organisation 	Lean organisation	Taylorism	Traditionalorganisation
Belgium	-0.22	0.32	-0.03	0.01	-0.23	0.42*	-0.11	-0.09
Denmark	0.63**	0.14	-0.82**	-0.79**	0.79**	0.29	-0.86**	-1.06**
Greece	-1.24**	0.35	0.85**	0.31	-1.33**	0.42	0.84**	0.12
Italy	-0.61**	0.24*	0.46**	0.20*	-0.51**	0.20	0.33**	0.16
Spain	-1.15**	0.96**	0.31*	0.04	-1.15**	1.08**	0.06	-0.17
France	-0.26**	0.72**	-0.29*	-0.27**	-0.32**	0.84**	-0.33**	-0.38**
Ireland	-0.92**	0.91**	0.45	-0.27	-1.11**	1.14**	0.47	-0.50
Luxembourg	-0.06	0.33	-0.21	-0.11	-0.17	0.42	0.00	-0.20
Netherlands	0.81**	-0.16	-1.10**	-0.59**	0.79**	0.02	-0.94**	-0.74**
Portugal	-0.81**	0.47**	0.58**	0.05	-0.78**	0.51**	0.44*	-0.01
UK	-0.40**	1.03**	-0.31**	-0.56**	-0.68**	1.32**	-0.24*	-0.72**
Finland	0.14	0.45*	-0.15	-0.71*	-0.01	0.63**	-0.07	-0.78*
Sweden	0.33*	-0.07	-0.77**	-0.01	0.22	0.06	-0.68*	0.00
Austria	0.13	0.12	-0.10	-0.24	0.33	0.14	-0.26	-0.43*
*: significant at 5%       **: significant at 1%         Reference country: Germany
Source: Third European Survey of Working Conditions. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.


Column 2 of Table 4 presents the estimates of national effects on the likelihood of using the lean forms without controls. Compared to Germany, where the use of the lean model is relatively low in relation to the 15-country weighted average (see Table 3), Spain, France, Ireland, Finland, the UK and Portugal display a relatively high propensity to use lean production methods. The coefficients are especially high for the UK, Ireland and Spain and they increase slightly and remain significant when structural controls are included. 

Overall, the results show that structural factors such as firm size, industry and occupation do not explain the marked national differences in the use of the different forms of work organisation. Instead, unexplained national factors that could be due to historically inherited management-worker relations or to differences in the impact of institutional setting on managerial decision making strongly influence national differences in the use of different sets of organisational practices. In sections 3 and 4 below we address this latter hypothesis in a preliminary manner by exploring the relation between the frequency of use of the different forms of work organisation and measures of national systems of labour market regulation and social protection. 


3. Characterising systems of labour market regulation and social protection

In order to characterise national systems of labour market regulation and social protection, we conduct a principal components and cluster analysis on the basis of 7 aggregate labour market and social benefit indicators available on the websites of Eurostat and the OECD (see Table 5). Two measures of life-long-learning are used. LLL refers to the percentage of persons aged 24-64 participating in education and training in the 4 weeks prior to the survey carried out in 2000. EMPCVT, which captures more firm or industry-specific training forms of life-long-learning, is the percentage of persons in all enterprises participating in continuous vocational education in 1999. 
.
Table 5
Variables for PCA of systems of labour market regulation and social protection: EU14

	LLL	EMPCVT	UNEMP	ACTIVE	EPLREG	EPLTEMP	SOCIAL
Belgium	6.8	41	1.67	.97	1.5	2.8	22.1
Denmark	20.8	53	1.58	1.67	1.6	.9	25.1
Germany	5.2	32	1.88	.99	2.8	2.3	25.8
Greece	1.1	15	.43	.26	2.4	4.8	23.4
Spain	5.1	25	1.33	.66	2.6	3.5	16.9
France	2.8	46	1.2	1.01	2.3	3.6	25.7
Ireland	7.7	41	.7	.79	1.6	.3	12.1
Italy	5.5	26	.51	.55	2.8	3.8	23.4
Netherlands	15.6	41	2.04	1.08	3.1	1.2	23.4
Austria	8.3	31	1.11	.39	2.6	1.8	25.9
Portugal	3.4	17	.67	.35	4.3	3	18.7
Finland	19.6	50	1.61	.74	2.1	1.9	21.8
Sweden	21.6	61	1.3	1.53	2.8	1.6	28
UK	21.1	49	.3	.2	.8	.3	25.3
Source: Eurostat for LLL, EMPCVT, UNEMP, ACTIVE and SOCIAL; OECD Employment Outlook 1999 for EMPREG and EMPLTEMP


UNEMPL measures expenditures on unemployment and income maintenance as a percentage of GDP in 2000.  ACTIVE measures expenditures, other than training, on active labour market policies as a percentage of GDP in 2000. These include job rotation and job sharing, employment incentives, integration of the disabled, direct job creation, and start-up incentives.  EPLREG and EPLTEMP are the OECD’s measures of the strictness for employment protection legislation for regular and temporary employment, respectively, for the late 1990’s. They provide indicators of the degree of flexibility of labour markets. SOCIAL is a measure of expenditures on social protection other than unemployment as a percentage of GDP in 2000. It includes the categories of sickness and health, disability, old age, survivors, and family and children.

Figure 1
Principal Components Analysis: 
Systems of labour market regulation and social protection




Figure 1 above gives the results of a principal components analysis performed on the 7 variables listed in Table 5 above.​[9]​ The first component, which accounts for about 48 percent of the total variance, is positively correlated with the two measures of life-long-learning and with the measure of active labour market polices, while it is negatively correlated with the strictness of employment protection regulation for temporary employees. This component can be interpreted as providing an indicator of what we refer to as ‘active flexibility’ in the sense that nations scoring high on this component are characterised by a combination of high investments in active labour market policies and few restriction on the hiring and firing of employees on fixed term contracts. This sort of flexibility constitutes an institutional setting that can be favourable to strategies of continuous knowledge exploration which depend on having relatively porous organisational boundaries so as to permit the continuous insertion of new knowledge and ideas from the outside the firm.

The second component, which accounts for about 21 percent of the variance, is positively correlated with the measures of expenditure on unemployment and income maintenance and with the measure of the strictness of employment protection legislation for regular employees. This component can be interpreted as providing a measure of what we have referred to elsewhere as ‘rigid security’ in the sense that it provides an indicator of the extent to which a nation is characterised by a combination of relatively rigid labour markets for full-time employees and high levels of unemployment protection. Alternatively, by reversing the scale, it can thought of providing a measure of ‘precarious flexibility’ in the sense that nations scoring low on this component are characterised by a combination of few restrictions on hiring and firing of full-time employees and low levels of expenditure on unemployment and income maintenance (Lundvall and Lorenz, 2006).  In what follows we use the reversed scale on the second component to characterise differences among EU nations.

The third component, which accounts for about 8 percent of the variance, is not shown graphically. It is positively correlated with the measure of expenditures on social protection other than unemployment, and its interpretation is straight forward (see Table A3, Appendix 3).













Figure 2
Cluster analysis based on first two components of the PCA analysis




Figure 2 above shows the results of a cluster analysis projected onto the first two planes of the PCA. The clustering, which uses Ward’s method on the basis of the scores of first two components of the PCA, results in an easily interpretable 4-cluster solution. As the graphical representation suggests, and as the figures in Table 6 below show more precisely, the first cluster is composed of the Scandinavian nations and the Netherlands. These are the nations that are typically identified with policies of ‘flexicurity’ and they all rank high on the first component measuring active flexibility. France, Germany, Austria and Belgium, with intermediate scores on the first component, form the second cluster. The 4 southern nations, which form the third cluster, have low scores on the first component corresponding to high levels of employment protection with limited expenditures on policies designed to promote labour market adjustment. This corresponds to what we have described elsewhere as systems of ‘precarious security’ (Lundvall and Lorenz, 2006). The fourth cluster is formed by the two Anglo-Saxon nations, the UK and Ireland. These countries stand out for their low scores on the second components corresponding to high degrees of precarious flexibility.   

Table 6
Cluster analysis of systems of labour market regulation and social protection
   (cluster averages)
Countries in cluster	NordicSE, DK, FI, NE	ContinentalDE, FR, BE, AT	SouthernPT, IT, ES, IT	Anglo-SaxonUK, IE	EU-14
% Population 24-65 yrs. life-long learning	19.4	5.8	3.8	14.4	10.3
% Employees receiving CVT (all enterprises)	51.3	37.5	20.8	45.0	37.7
Expenditure on Active LMP as a % of GDP	1.3	0.8	0.46	0.42	0.80
Expenditure on unemployment and income maintenance as a % of GDP	1.6	1.5	0.74	0.5	1.2
Expenditure on Social Benefits as a % of GDP	24.6	24.9	20.6	18.7	28
EPL strictness for regular employment	2.4	2.3	3.0	1.2	2.4
EPL strictness for temporary employment	1.4	2.6	3.8	0.3	2.3



4. The relation between work organisation and systems of labour market regulation

In our introductory comments to this paper we hypothesized that national systems combining low levels of employment protection with relatively high levels of unemployment protection and expenditure on ‘active’ labour market policies may have an advantage in terms of the adoption of the forms of work organisation that promote knowledge exploration and learning. In order to provide evidence that bears on the proposed link between work organisation and systems of labour market regulation and social protection, we present a series of scatter plot diagrams showing the correlations between the frequency of the four forms of work organisation and our measures of active and precarious flexibility for the 14 EU nations for which the data is available.  

Figure 3 below presents the results of this exercise for the measure of active flexibility. The principal result, which is consistent with our main hypothesis, is that there is a strong positive correlation between the degree of active flexibility and the frequency of the discretionary learning forms of work organisation characterised by high levels of learning, problem-solving and autonomy in work. There are strong negative correlations with the frequency of the Taylorist and traditional forms of work organisation characterised by relatively low levels of learning, problem-solving and autonomy in work. 

Figure 4 below presents the same analysis for our measure of precarious flexibility. The main result here is that we find a fairly strong positive correlation between this measure and the frequency of the lean forms of organisation, and a negative relation with the frequency of the discretionary learning forms. The graph also brings out the distinctive situation of the two Anglo-Saxon nations characterised by both high levels of precarious flexibility and high frequency of the lean forms of work organisation. One possible explanation for this is that forms of work organisation depending on high levels of employee discretion in processes of learning and problem-solving depend on high levels of trust.​[10]​ Such trust may prove difficult to develop or sustain in institutional setting characterised by both low unemployment protection and few constraints on employers’ ability to lay-off employees. In such institutional settings, employees, fearing the negative income consequences of unemployment, may be unwilling to commit themselves to processes of knowledge exchange learning. Rather, they will choose to adopt defensive strategies possibly based on knowledge hoarding in an effort to protect their position and their existing shares of enterprise quasi-rents. Faced with such incentive problems, employers may be encouraged to adopt more top-down managerial strategies based on tighter levels of supervision and control, and this may account for the distinctive preference of UK and Irish employers for thee relatively bureaucratic lean forms of work organisation over the discretionary learning forms.

Figure 3
Active Flexibility and Forms of Work Organisation










Figure 4
Precarious Flexibility and Form of Work Organisation





While the aggregate-level indicators we use preclude exploring these different hypotheses in greater detail, our results nonetheless provide support for the view that there are systemic links between the way labour markets are regulated in a nation and the nature of work and learning at the workplace. More specifically, the positive correlation between the frequency of the discretionary learning forms of work organisation and our measure of active flexibility supports the idea that institutional settings characterised the combination of low levels of employment protection and high levels of investment in active labour market polices, including expenditures on life-long- learning, provide a fertile environment for the development of forms of work organisation that promote learning and knowledge exploration. 


5. Conclusion

In Arundel, Lorenz, Lundvall and Valeyre (forthcoming) we provided evidence showing that in nations where work is organised to support high levels of discretion in solving complex problems firms tend to be more active in terms of innovations developed through their own in-house creative efforts. In countries where learning and problem-solving on the job are constrained, and little discretion is left to the employee, firms tend to engage in a supplier-dominated innovation strategies. Their technological renewal depends more on the absorption of innovations developed elsewhere We concluded that paper by observing that national differences in learning and innovation mode can be only partially accounted for differences in industrial structure, and that a major challenge for future research to understand the underlying ‘unexplained’ national factors that influence firms’ organisational choices as well as their innovation performance. 

In this paper we have taken a first step towards addressing this research agenda by developing a set of EU-wide aggregate measures to explore the relation between the organisation of work and systems of labour market regulation and social protection. Although our data can only show correlations rather than causality and are aggregated at the national level, they support the view that the way work is organised is highly nation-specific and that it varies in a systemic way with the way employment and unemployment security and labour markets are regulated.

The implications of these results are that the institutional set-up determining the dynamic performance of national systems is much broader than normally assumed when applying the innovation system concept. The redistribution policies and institutions are of fundamental importance for how firms learn and innovate. This is especially true for social protection and labour market institutions. There are alternative ways to build ‘high performance innovation systems’ and different innovation systems tend to organize work and distribute welfare differently among citizens.

This perspective has important implications for European policy and in particular for the current process of revitalizing the Lisbon agenda. It is true that the Lisbon process set the focus not only on economic growth but also on social cohesion. But it appears as if, for the Commission, the social dimension has been added as something outside the innovation process—sometimes seen even as a kind of historical burden that Europe is obliged to carry when competing with the US, Japan, and China. Agreement on the nebulous concept ‘structural reform’ has substituted for an open debate on the strength and weaknesses of different types of national welfare systems in Europe. Our research on national systems of competence-building implies that this view is mistaken since national systems of social protection are structurally interrelated to modes of learning and innovation. Not only do people work and learn differently under different welfare regimes. The welfare they experience from specific modes of working and learning reflects such differences. On this basis we would argue that recognition of the national systemic differences in these respects should be a first step in defining a revised agenda for European integration. A revitalization of the Lisbon process should take the national learning systems and their interrelated welfare regimes as point of departure for defining a new set of policy strategies. A policy package that aims at promoting the learning economy and takes into account national systemic differences and preferences may be a way to break the current stalemate in Europe.
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Appendix 1

Table A1
Organisational Variables

Variable	Mean
Team work	1 if your job involves doing all or part of your work in a team, 0 otherwise	64,2
Job rotation	1 if your job involves rotating tasks between yourself  and colleagues, 0 otherwise	48,9
Quality norms	1 if your main paid job involves meeting precise quality standards, 0 otherwise	74,4
Discretion in fixing work methods	1 if you are able to choose or change your methods of work, 0 otherwise	61,7
Discretion in setting work pace	1 if you are able to choose or change your pace of work, 0 otherwise	63,6
Horizontal constraints on work pace	1 if on the whole your pace of work is dependent on thework of your colleagues, 0 otherwise	53,1
Hierarchical constraints on work pace	1 if on the whole your pace of work is dependent on thedirect control of your boss,  0 otherwise	38,9
Norm-based constraints on work pace	1 if on the whole your pace of work is dependent on thenumerical production targets, 0 otherwise	38,7
Automatic constraints on work pace	1 if on the whole your pace of work is dependent on theautomatic speed of a machine or movement of a product, 0 otherwise	26,7
Employee responsibility for quality control	1 if the employee’s main paid job involves assessing him or herself the quality of his or her own work, 0 otherwise	72,6
Employee problem-solving	1 if your job involves solving unforeseen problems on your own, 0 otherwise	79.3
Learning new things	1 if your job involves learning new things on your own, 0 otherwise	71,4
Task Complexity	1 if your job involves complex tasks, 0 otherwise	56,7
Task monotony	1 if your job involves monotonous tasks, 0 otherwise 	42,4
Task repetitiveness	1 if your work involves short repetitive tasks of less than one minute, 0 otherwise	24,9


Appendix 2

Figure A1
Graphical Representation of first two planes of MCA - 15 Organisational Variables 


The figure above presents graphically the first two axes or factors of the multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). The first factor or axis, accounting for 18% of the inertia or chi-squared statistic, distinguishes between taylorist and ‘post-taylorist’ organisational forms. Thus on one side of the axis we find the variables measuring autonomy, learning, problem-solving and task complexity and to a lesser degree quality management, while on the other side we find the variables measuring monotony and the various factors constraining work pace, notably those linked to the automatic speed of equipment or flow of products, and to the use of quantitative production norms. The second factor or axis, accounting for 15% of the chi-squared statistic, is structured by two groups of variables characteristic of the lean production model: first, the use of teams and job rotation which are associated with the importance of horizontal constraints on work pace; and secondly those variables measuring the use of quality management techniques which are associated with what we have called ‘automatic’ and ‘norm-based’ constraints. The third factor, which accounts for 8 percent of the chi-squared statistic, is also structured by these two groups of variables. However, it brings into relief the distinction between on the one hand those organisational settings characterised by team work, job rotation and horizontal interdependence in work, and on the other hand those organisational settings where the use of quality norms, automatic and quantitative norm-based constraints on work pace are important. The second and third axes of the analysis demonstrate that the simple dichotomy between taylorist and lean organisational methods is not sufficient for capturing the organisational variety that exists across European nations.

The projection of the centre of gravity of the four organisational clusters coming out of the hierarchical classification analysis (see Table 2) onto the graphic representation of the first two factors of the MCA shows that the four clusters correspond to the quite different working conditions. The discretionary learning cluster is located to the east of the graph, the lean cluster to the south, the taylorist cluster to the west and the traditional cluster to the north.


Appendix 3

Table A2
PCA of systems of labour market regulation:
eigenvalues and proportion of explained variance

No.	Eigenvalues	Proportion	Cumulative
1	3.4	48.4	48.4
2	1.5	21.3	69.7
3	.9	13.4	83.2
4	.6	8.5	91.7
5	.3	4.7	96.3
6	.2	2.4	98.7
7	.1	1.3	100




Table A3
PCA of systems of labour market regulation:
correlations between variables and components

	Components 
Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
LLL	.87	-.20	.12	-.32	.00	-.27	-.11
EMPLCVT	.95	-.08	.06	.06	.17	-.03	.24
ACTIVE 	.73	.51	-.21	.18	.33	.09	-.13
UNEMPL	.51	.68	-.33	.14	-.37	-.07	.03
EPLREG	-.49	.63	-.12	-.57	.12	.00	.07
EPLTEMP	-.75	.42	.28	.33	.15	-.25	.02
SOCIAL	.38	.39	.82	-.05	-.11	.12	-.02


















QN: precise quality norms
Team: team work
Rot: job rotation
Mono: task monotony
Rep: task repetiveness
Flowc: automatic constraints on work pace
Nrmc: quantitative norm constraints on work pace
Hierc: hierarchical constraints on work pace
Horc: horizontal constraints on work pace
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^1	  Paper prepared for the CAS workshop on “Innovation in firms”, Oslo, 30 Oct. - 1 Nov. 2007. This paper draws on research carried out jointly with Anthony Arundel and Antoine Valeyre. See Arundel et al. (forthcoming).
^2	  The OECD measures of the strictness of employment protection legislation for he late 1990s are not available for Luxembourg.
^3	  This section draws extensively on Lorenz and Valeyre (2005) and on Arundel et al. (forthcoming). 
^4	  The initial findings of the survey are presented in a European Foundation report by D. Merllié and P. Paoli [2001].
^5	  For the questions and coding used to construct the measures upon which the statistical analysis is based, see Appendix 1.
^6	  The factor analysis method used here is multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) which is especially suitable for the analysis of categorical variables. Unlike principal components analysis where the total variance is decomposed along the principal factors or components, in multiple correspondence analysis the total variation of the data matrix is measured by the usual chi-squared statistic for row-column independence, and it is the chi-squared statistic which is decomposed along the principal factors. It is common to refer to the percentage of the ‘inertia’ accounted for by a factor. Inertia is defined as the value of the chi-squared statistic of the original data matrix divided by the grand total of the number of observations. See Benzecri, J.P. (1973); Greenacre (1993, pp. 24-31). 
^7	  For a graphical presentation of the positions of the centres of gravity of the clusters on the first two factors of the MCA, see Appendix 2. 
^8	  The percentages are weighted.
^9	  See Table in the Annex for the correlations between the variables and all 7 components.
^10	  For an extensive discussion based on international comparisons, see Lorenz 1992 and 1995)
